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opponents is growing, so it takes less
courage to go to war. Achilles had the
courage to fight face-to-face, taking
risks and facing danger directly.
For many, distancing oneself from
danger—even the risk of danger—by
using technology imposes a fundamental
weakness on the modern warrior amid
the challenges he faces. Kaurin presents
a detailed analysis of courage in an
asymmetrical context, with a prescription for developing courageous warriors.
Another moral attribute that Kaurin
sees as essential to the warrior ethos is
loyalty. This loyalty is built on leadership and trust and is a foundation of
the profession of arms. Referencing
the Illiad, she compares the loyalty of
Achilles, the traditional warrior, with
that of Hector, the contemporary,
professional warrior. A strategy for
training warriors for loyalty is laid
out. In addition to excellent military
ethics literature references, Kaurin uses
film to illustrate key ethical points.
The combatant/noncombatant
distinction must be made clear for the
soldier considering jus in bello. Kaurin
proposes a five-level gradation of power
and threat, from highest to lowest:
• uniformed combat personnel
• unconventional belligerents
• those provisionally hostile
• neutral or nonhostile noncombatants
• vulnerable noncombatants
Discerning the appropriate category
of combatant/noncombatant would
determine the appropriate level of force.
Such a moral model of ascertaining
the threat level would equip the soldier
better in the ethics of jus in bello.
Kaurin’s thoughts are a contribution
to the literature on the higher level of
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moral thinking for military leaders. She
does not shy away from the conundrums
the warrior faces. To maintain an
ethical edge in asymmetrical warfare,
military ethics must be embedded into
the culture of the profession of arms.
THOMAS E. CREELY

The General vs. the President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War, by H. W. Brands.
New York: Doubleday, 2016. 448 pages. $30.

The relief of General of the Army
Douglas MacArthur by President Harry
S. Truman remains one of the most
controversial and debated wartime
command decisions made in the
military history of the United States.
By April 1951, Douglas MacArthur was
at the peak of his game as a military
leader. His public pressing to widen the
war in Korea, in direct contradiction
to the intent of his president, and his
public statements to that end that led
to his dismissal still fuel debate today.
H. W. Brands gives depth to the tale of
MacArthur versus Truman by including the complexities that existed in
the Korean conflict and its Cold War
context, when a U.S.-led “free world”
was engaged in a global struggle against
Soviet-led Communism (and especially
Soviet interest in Central Europe). As
the fighting in Korea continued, official
Washington, and the Pentagon in
particular, worried that the war effort
was tying down more and more U.S.
military resources—worries that
fueled further concerns that Moscow
might see the United States stretched
militarily and unable to defend
Central Europe adequately.
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Brands highlights another lesser-known
aspect of the Korean War: MacArthur’s
desire to bring Chinese Nationalist
forces into the fight. Truman and the
Joint Chiefs, knowing how this could
antagonize Mao’s China and possibly
widen the war, did not view the idea
favorably. Truman and the Joint Chiefs
were not convinced that Chiang
Kai-shek’s corrupt and recently defeated
forces would prove more of an advantage
than a burden to the fight in Korea.
MacArthur also clearly chafed at what
he perceived to be Truman’s hesitancy
in fighting Communism. Truman, in
turn, remained focused on the Communist threat to Central Europe and
U.S. commitments to its European allies,
all the while trying to balance resisting
Communist aggression in Korea against
preventing the conflict from widening.

presidential nomination. Yet, not
desiring to campaign and growing ever
more shrill in his speeches, MacArthur
quickly doomed his potential candidacy
to oblivion. His seeming advocacy for
the use of nuclear weapons in Korea
gave civilian and military leaders further
pause, particularly when he suggested
“sowing of fields of suitable radio-active
material” in theater. Interestingly, it
was President-elect Eisenhower who
later broke the peace talk deadlock
by intimating his openness to using
nuclear weapons against the Chinese.

Yet the conflict in Korea did widen
when Chinese forces entered the fray
in November 1950—an escalation
that caught MacArthur off guard.
Only a month earlier, in his famous
meeting with Truman at Wake
Island, he categorically had dismissed
Chinese intervention as a concern.

Perhaps the most damning part of
the MacArthur story is the general’s
testimony before the Senate Armed
Services and Foreign Relations Committees upon his relief of command
and forced return from Japan. The
testimony, which Brands recounts in
great detail, makes for some of the best
reading. MacArthur tries to live up to
his reputation, yet appears to be out of
his league before inquisitive senators.
He ultimately loses what support he
had from Republicans, who, while no
fans of Truman, in the end opted not
to cast their lots with MacArthur.

The central element of the MacArthurTruman controversy proved to be the
persona of Douglas MacArthur himself.
Having lived and fought in the Pacific
since 1937 (and not having returned to
the United States until his relief in 1951),
MacArthur had a self-described faith in
his understanding of the “Asian mind.”
By 1951 MacArthur, then seventy-one,
had lost touch with his country, which
had changed considerably in the thirteen
years since he had been there last. Believing he could speak for the American
people, MacArthur allowed a draft effort
to go forward for the 1952 Republican

A few aspects of the book did prove
distracting. Detailed maps of the
Korean Peninsula showing the many
stages of the Korean War would have
added to the reader’s understanding of
the conflict but are absent. Further, a
glitch in binding resulted in the Korean
Peninsula map that was included on the
inside cover being upside down. The
reviewer contacted the publisher via
e-mail and, although acknowledged,
was not responded to. And on page
329 the author’s passage “MacArthur’s
prediction that by January 1950 the
victory would be so complete” is clearly
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a misprint, because North Korea did not
invade South Korea until June 1950.
These items are minor and easily
corrected in a future edition. What
remains still is a powerful book that
goes into great detail, benefiting
from the storytelling ability of H. W.
Brands. We hope that a civil-military
conflict between a towering figure like
MacArthur and a sitting U.S. president
is unlikely to reoccur. Yet the story
remains a valid one today, with its lessons on the reach of military power in
a democracy, the role of the president
in setting national policy, and the role
of civilian oversight of military power.
DAVID L. TESKA

The Pacific War and Contingent Victory: Why
Japanese Defeat Was Not Inevitable, by Michael
W. Myers. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2015.
208 pages. $34.95.

The Pacific War and Contingent Victory
is “an exercise in the elucidation of
terms”—an exercise necessary to
determine whether the Empire of
Japan could have avoided defeat at the
hands of the United States and its allies.
The focus on “terms” is important,
as precision and clarity are vital to
Professor Michael Myers’s effort to
challenge the near-universal acceptance
of the idea that Japanese defeat was
inevitable. On the contrary, Myers
argues that there were several points
in the war where the arc of history was
subject to change, given a different mix
of luck, skill, will, or strategy. Myers’s
book takes aim at British historian H.
P. Willmott—a leading proponent of
the inevitability school—and Willmott’s
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assertion that since “the defeat of
Japan was assured” no single battle or
campaign can be considered “decisive.”
The Pacific War and Contingent
Victory challenges this conventional
view that inherent industrial, financial,
and demographic shortcomings all
but guaranteed Japanese defeat.
Myers is also careful to argue that,
while the Japanese could have avoided
defeat, this does not mean necessarily
that they ultimately could have gained
victory. Rather, Japan might have
realized outcomes short of actual defeat,
such as an armistice preserving some
of the gains made early in the war, a
return to the status quo ante bellum, or
even a negotiated surrender that left
Japan more intact than it would be when
it ultimately did surrender in 1945.
Myers’s challenge to Willmott and the
rest of the proponents of inevitable
Japanese defeat is built on an insistence
on precise terms: as he explains, all that
is required is to show that there was the
slightest chance of a Japanese victory,
however long the odds or improbable
the required chain of events. If, even
under the most remote of conditions,
a different outcome could have occurred, then the inevitability argument
is defeated. Myers then argues that if
defeat was not a certainty, then one
or more events—be they battles or
campaigns or just a moment of good
or ill fortune—had to be decisive. It is
difficult, perhaps even impossible, to
argue with Myers’s logic. His position
is somewhat similar to that of a lawyer
defending the owners of a carnival who
offer a commonly found midway game
involving tossing softballs into milk cans
for prizes. All the lawyer has to do is
show that it is possible for the softball to
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